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<div><span class="gmail_quote">On 2/10/07, <b class="gmail_sendername"><a href="mailto:linux@oneandoneis2.org">linux@oneandoneis2.org</a></b> <<a href="mailto:linux@oneandoneis2.org">linux@oneandoneis2.org</a>> wrote:
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid">Quoting Steve Dobson <<a href="mailto:steve@dobson.org">steve@dobson.org</a>>:<br>> Palladium, Treacherous Computing (TC), call it what you will, I agree
<br>> that it is an abusive technology.<br><br>Actually, from what I understand about TC, I'm not even convinced by<br>that much.<br><br>Many of the arguments people give for why it's a bad thing are<br>actually untrue. Things like "You won't be able to install Linux on a
<br>Trusted Computing machine" are popular claims that are simply wrong.</blockquote>
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<div>This week. But take a careful look at where it's headed: Brian LaMacchia, who is one of the core authors of the technology, at his MIT presentation on it when it was called Palladium, indicated that there's a real security desire to control the BIOS and boot devices. It's even extensible with the existing standards to control media devices such as DVD drives or USB memory sticks: this would force those devices to be accessible only with authorized software, namely software that has been issued the appropriate keys. There's a real risk that under the aegis of security concerns a motherboard manufacturer can make hardware bootable only with their authorized kernels.
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<div>That gets into serious tying of hardware to specific software packages and should be taken very seriously. There are similar issues with software and file formats: Windows Media DRM seems aimed at the models of MS DRM^H^H^H Trusted Computing.
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