[Gllug] New EU data retention rules approved

[Rev Simon Rumble]

On 14/12/2005, "t.clarke" <tim at seacon.co.uk> wrote:

>SMTP traffic cannot, surely be 'proxied' ?

Sure it can, just like any other protocol.  Won't be easy or cheap,
though.  The easier approach would just be to block outbound port 25 to
all except the ISP's own SMTP servers.  This would have some nice
anti-spam side-effects, but would leave users reliant on flaky ISP SMTP
servers.

But then, mine is in the US so I couldn't give a rat's.

>And how on earth is retaining data on unanswered mobile-phone calls going to
>catch terrorists who use them to detonate bombs?  All they need to do is
>use a public call box or a stolen mobile to make the call !  And I guess most
>pay-as-yu-go mobiles are effectively untraceable also?

Actually this kind of thing could be incredibly useful.  The traffic
analysis could come in quite handy.  If you knew that all successful
calls were logged, you could easily use unsuccessful calls to send
meaningful messages with prior arrangement.  Even if it's just "task
accomplished" or "go".

Smart terrists will surely be learning all they can about informational
security, traffic analysis and subscribing to Cryptogram.  These people
will already be difficult to track down.

This kind of traffic data will be used to catch the stupid terrists, or
the terrists who make a mistake.  They claim that mobile phone records
helped track down the Madrid bombers quite quickly, and that sounds
believable.

PAYG phones are untraceable in that you can't pin them to an individual.
 You can, however, work out where the mobile phone is.  That could be
critical information.
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